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Abstract
The paper develops a simple model on the asymmetric role of credit markets
in output fluctuations. When credit markets are underdeveloped and enterprise
activity is financed by trade credit, shocks may induce a break-up of credit and
production chains, leading to sudden and sharp contractions. The development
of a banking sector can reduce the probability of such collapses and hence plays a
crucial role in softening output declines. However, the banking sector becomes a
shock amplifier when shocks originate in the financial sector. Using industry-level
data across a large cross-section of countries, we provide evidence in support of
the model’s predictions.
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1 Introduction
“If developing-country output paths look more like mountains, cliffs, and plains than
the steady ‘hills’ observed in the industrial world, then looking for an explanation
of average cross-country growth differences can lead to misleading results (Pritchett,
2000)”. In other words, neglecting crisis episodes gives a misleading picture of the
growth process, especially for emerging markets (EMs)1. Looking at the period 1960-
2000, Durlauf et al. (2005) report that “Of the 102 countries in our sample, 50 showed
at least one three-year output collapse of 15% or more. 65 countries experienced a
three-year output collapse of 10% or more. In contrast, between 1960 and 2000, the
largest three-year output collapse in the USA was 5.4%, and in the UK 3.6%, both
recorded in 1979-82. It is not clear that the dynamics of output in the wake of a major
collapse would look anything like the dynamics at other times”. Furthermore, these
episodes of sharp output collapse tend to affect long-term growth, as recently found
by Cerra and Saxena (2008). This evidence suggests that variables usually identified
as drivers of economic growth may have sharply different effects on output decline and
output growth. In this paper, we investigate this issue in connection with one of the
1For an analysis of output behavior during different types of recessions see Claessens, S., Kose, A.
and M.E. Terrones (2008), ‘What Happens During Recessions, Crunches and Busts?,’ CEPR Discussion
Papers 7085.
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main determinants of growth analyzed in the literature, namely the development of the
financial sector.
Although several analytical contributions emphasize the asymmetric effect of finance
on output, with larger effects during downturns2, the empirical literature, including the
seminal work by Rajan and Zingales (1998), has generally assumed symmetric effects,
studying the impact of finance on average rates of growth. It is worth noting that the
seminal paper by Rajan and Zingales (1998) covers the period between 1980 and 1990
and therefore excludes the experiences of sharp output collapse associated with crises
in developing and emerging markets which occurred after 1990.
Our analysis is close to the work by Braun and Larrain (2005), who found a much
stronger effect of financial market frictions during periods of downturn, defined as pe-
riods of negative output gap. In contrast to their analysis that focuses on short-term
cyclical fluctuations, we focus on episodes of sharp output contraction and, furthermore,
we distinguish between financial crises and recessions associated with different types of
shocks. The correlation between financial underdevelopment and extreme drops in out-
put has also been found in previous analyses (Raddatz (2006)). In addition, empirical
analyses carried out using the UNIDO data set (which we also use in this paper) indi-
cate that a larger financial sector (for instance in terms of credit to GDP) is associated
2See for example Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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with stronger adverse effects of banking crises3.
In this paper, we investigate whether credit markets play a significant role in softe-
ning (or magnifying) the effects of negative shocks during episodes of output decline4.
We develop a simple theoretical framework that illustrates how underdeveloped credit
market institutions may initiate episodes of sharp output decline. In particular, a
model of production chains, in which firms are interlinked through trade credit con-
tracts, shows how exogenous shocks may lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium in which
production chains are broken and output declines sharply when credit market institu-
tions are weak. The model also illustrates how the development of a banking sector
reduces the risk of such a sub-optimal equilibrium, except for the case of shocks orig-
inating in the financial sector or aggregate shocks. The relevance of credit chains has
been explored in previous work5. Following Calvo and Coricelli (1996) and Kim and
Shin (2007), we emphasize the circularity of the system, with symmetry between assets
and liabilities (payables and receivables). Traditionally, trade credit has been seen as
a mechanism to channel liquidity from liquidity-rich firms to liquidity-poor firms. In
contrast, we emphasize the linkages among firms, through production and credit chains,
associated with zero net trade credit. The chain is the main amplifying mechanism.
3See for example Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan (2008), and Klingebield, Kroszner and Laeven
(2007).
4See also Calvo et al. (2006) for an examination of the role of financial factors in explaining sharp
output collapses.
5See for example Kyiotaki and Moore (1997), Calvo and Coricelli (1996), and Kim and Shin (2007).
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Raddatz (2008) found that trade credit chains increase the correlation between output
fluctuations in industries linked through input-output chains. Fisman and Love (2003)
extended Rajan and Zingales (1998) to take into account the reliance of sectors on trade
credit. They found evidence of substitutability between trade credit and other sources
of finance and concluded that in less developed financial markets firms relying more on
trade credit perform better than other firms. Therefore, trade credit could soften the
negative effects of financial underdevelopment. Our analysis reaches different conclu-
sions, both at the theoretical and empirical levels. In our model, trade credit chains
act as a channel for the amplification of adverse shocks, especially in less developed
financial markets.
The novelty of the model is that trade credit per se does not increase the vulnera-
bility of a system to shocks. Vulnerability is a function of the degree of development of
the overall financial sector. Such overall development is related to the degree of trust
in the system and the strength of contract enforcement institutions. After all, with
perfect markets, a system of trade credit based on IOU’s supports a Pareto optimal
equilibrium in which the system does not require outside finance (from outside the
enterprise sector). It is worth noting that trade credit plays an important role both
in advanced and underdeveloped financial sectors. However, depending on the overall
degree of financial development, trade credit has sharply different implications in terms
of the amplification of shocks. The idea is that when the financial sector is developed,
for instance through deep official credit markets, difficulties arising from insolvencies
5
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within the trade credit chain can be buffered by relying on bank credit. In contrast,
in countries with less developed financial sectors, insolvencies in the trade credit chain
cannot be buffered because of the lack of alternative sources of financing.
The empirical part of the paper tests the predictions of the theoretical model regarding
the role of financial markets in softening output declines and making them less likely,
as well as the predictions regarding trade credit and its interaction with bank credit
and financial development. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we analyze the role
of credit markets on output performance by focusing on the differential performance of
industries. We analyze whether industries that are more dependent on external finance
experience larger drops in output in countries with less developed financial markets.
We find robust evidence of such effects. Furthermore, we find that the development
of financial markets does not shield industries with high reliance on external finance
when the shock originates in the financial sector. Indeed, during episodes of financial
crises, industries that rely more on external finance are hit harder than less dependent
industries. The empirical analysis also provides insights into the impact of trade credit
on output dynamics. First, we find that a higher reliance on trade credit relative to
bank credit at the firm and country levels increases the probability and magnitude of
sharp contractions. Second, we find that sectors that rely more on trade credit relative
to bank credit experience milder contractions in countries with a better developed fi-
nancial sector.
6
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.22
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a model of production chains,
in which firms are interlinked through trade credit contracts, and describes the various
possible equilibria conditional on the level of contract enforcement in credit markets.
The model demonstrates how exogenous shocks may lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium
in which production chains break down when credit market institutions are weak. Fi-
nally, the model shows how the development of a banking sector reduces the risk of the
emergence of a sub-optimal equilibrium. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis that
lends support to the various predictions of the theoretical model. Section 4 concludes.
2 A simple model of production chains with trade
credit
2.1 Production chain equilibria
Starting with Adam Smith, one of the main tenets of economics has been that deeper
division of labor leads to greater productivity. Both at the national and international
levels, the largest share of trade involves the exchange of intermediate goods between in-
dependent firms6. In a market economy, such division of labor requires the use of credit
as the exchange of inputs occurs in a sequential rather than simultaneous manner. A
natural way of representing this process of division of labor is through a production
chain in which firms are each other’s suppliers and customers. When contract enforce-
6See Ethier (1982).
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ment is perfect, the production chain can be supported by a system of inter-enterprise
trade credit, without the need for a banking system. However, in reality contract
enforcement is far from perfect and every entrepreneur-creditor is exposed to the pro-
bability of its customers defaulting on their debts, in particular following a negative
shock to the economy. We develop a rudimentary model of production chains, in which
firms are interlinked through trade credit contracts, and show how weak credit market
institutions, proxied by a measure of contract enforcement, increase the vulnerability of
an economy to exogenous shocks. In particular, the model demonstrates how exogenous
shocks may lead to the collapse of production chains when credit market institutions
are weak.
Assume that n symmetric firms are organized along a production chain, in which each
firm is linked to two partners only, one supplier and one customer7. Every firm is
endowed with a unit of an intermediary good N . It can either sell it as an input to
another firm, the customer, at a price p = 18 or sell it on a ‘secondary market’ at a
discounted price µ < 1. As in Blanchard and Kremer (1997), this alternative use of the
7This high degree of specificity in the relationships between firms is only introduced for expositional
simplicity. The model is similar to the one analyzed by Blanchard and Kremer (1997), with two main
differences: First, we assume that firms are endowed with a unit of an intermediary good that they
cannot directly consume. Second, we allow for the presence of trade credit, or claims on future output,
and later a banking system.
8Assuming symmetry across firms, it is clear that inputs N will exchange at the same price in every
market. Thus, a price p = 1 is an equilibrium price.
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input may for example involve the production of a much simpler good, with a lower
value, because it avoids the division of labor that is present in the production chain.
Every firm has to purchase its own input from another firm, the supplier, at a price of
p = 1. All firms use an identical production technology. The production function of
firm i is represented by the following linear function
yi = λNj
with λ > 1 and Nj the input that firm i purchased from firm j. Final output can
be consumed by the entrepreneur. Suppliers can decide to stay out of the production
chain and, instead of producing, obtain the liquidation value of N , which is equal to
µN , with µ < 1. Since λ > 1 > µ, firms have an incentive to supply inputs to each
other, i.e. to enter the production chain.
Following Smith’s idea of external economies of scale, we assume that the more spe-
cialized the production process, the larger is aggregate output. In other words, the
‘aggregate production function’ is increasing in the number of inputs used - reflecting
the length of the production chain or the degree of specialization of the economy. Define
Y as aggregate output
Y = f(nyi)
with n the number of firms in the economy and f ′n > 0. Assuming that there is a
continuum of firms, we can simply represent aggregate output as the following linear
9
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function.
Y = f(nyi) = Ψ
nnyi
with Ψ > 1.
Given that there is a time interval between the sale-purchase of inputs and the comple-
tion of production, suppliers of inputs obtain a claim on the output of their customers
in the amount of N . In other words, the equilibrium is supported by a system of trade
credit (in the form of accounts payable and accounts receivable). Assume firms grant
each other trade credit at zero interest. Each firm is both creditor and debtor in the
inter-enterprise trade credit market. In other words, an entrepreneur simultaneously
lends to his customers and borrows from his suppliers. The entrepreneur’s balance sheet
has accounts receivable and accounts payable. Hence the entrepreneur is exposed to
the risk of default by his customers. Assume pi ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of default in
the economy.
Finally, the strength of credit market institutions, or the degree of contract enforcement,
is measured by the share of a loan that the lender recovers if the borrower defaults, i.e.
the recovery rate β ∈ [0, 1]9. This parameter reflects a large number of institutional
variables, such as the quality of bankruptcy law and the judicial system for commercial
disputes. Partly stimulated by research on transition economies, the literature widely
9Enforcement is perfect when β = 1.
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acknowledges the importance of institutions for the functioning of financial markets10.
Figure 1 below shows a clear positive relationship between the development of the finan-
cial system, measured as the credit-to-GDP ratio, and recovery rates11 in our sample.
Figure 1: Financial development and recovery rate
If the customer defaults, the supplier will receive only a fraction of its claim, namely
βN . Given the possibility of default and non-perfect contract enforcement, firms have
to decide whether they want to enter the production chain (henceforth PC) described
above or sell their endowments on the ‘secondary market’. Such choice depends on the
value of expected utility associated with entering the PC compared to the certain utility
obtained through liquidation of the initial endowment. Assuming firms are risk-neutral,
10See for example Roland (2000).
11Recovery rates are taken from the World Bank Doing Business surveys 2004-2007.
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the expected utility of a firm entering a PC is
E(U)pce = (1− pi)λN + pi(λ− 1 + β)N
which has to be compared with the liquidation value µN obtained in ‘autarchy’. Hence,
the firm will enter the PC if and only if
(1− pi)λN + pi(λ− 1 + β)N > µN
or
β >
µ+ pi − λ
pi
= β∗ (1)
In other words, the production chain equilibrium (PCE) can only arise if contract en-
forcement in credit markets is sufficiently high. The PCE is clearly Pareto optimal. Not
only is individual output higher than under ‘autarchy’, aggregate output also increases
with the length of the chain.
2.1.1 Collapse of production chains following a shock
For a given β, factors inducing an increase in β∗ may produce a switch from a PCE to
an ‘autarchic’ equilibrium. Such a factor is the probability of default, pi, that can be
affected by negative shocks to the economy.
β∗ has the following properties:
∂β∗
∂pi
> 0 ;
∂β∗
∂µ
> 0 ;
∂β∗
∂λ
< 0
12
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For our analysis, the most interesting effect is the impact of an increase in the probabi-
lity of default on β∗. Given β, a shock to pi can lead to the breakdown of a PCE and a
reversal to autarchy, explaining crisis volatility in countries with poor levels of contract
enforcement. Indeed, if we interpret an increase in the probability of default as resulting
from shocks to the economy, the positive impact of an increase in pi on β∗ implies that a
shock can lead to a discrete collapse in output in countries with underdeveloped credit
markets (β close to β∗). If β∗ increases, following an increased probability of default,
then β might fall short of the new threshold β∗, in which case the PCE breaks down12.
Associated to the cut-off value of β = β∗ there is a cut-off value of the probability
of default, pi∗ . Because the value of pi∗ depends on the level of development of credit
markets, the likely condition of EMs, with less efficient financial markets, is one in which
pi∗ is small - or equivalently β is low and close to β∗. In other words, EMs are more
likely to find themselves in the autarchic equilibrium or to revert to it after a shock
to the probability of default. Hence, the model shows how poor contract enforcement
in credit markets may help explain not only the fact that EMs display higher output
volatility but also the observation that volatility in EMs tends to be associated with
12Note that it is not the level of trade credit per se that increases the vulnerability to shocks in this
model. Rather, it is the combination of weak credit market institutions and the extensive usage of
trade credit that sharply magnifies exogenous shocks through the break-up of production chains. A
banking sector may arise to mitigate that vulnerability.
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discrete and large changes in output, rather than regular random variations around a
trend13.
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between total expected utility (output) and the pro-
bability of default pi and represents the various possible equilibria a given economy
can end up in for different levels of contract enforcement β. Identify a cut-off value of
the probability of default, pi∗, that is the one associated with β = β∗. With perfect
enforcement (β = 1), output is ΨnnλN , that is the level of output associated with the
Pareto optimal solution. Note that, with perfect enforcement, the PCE will always
arise given that β∗ < 1. Moreover, for any d however small, the PCE will be the one
without generalized default. When pi < pi∗ but β < 1, the economy is in a PCE and
output is a continuous decreasing function of pi, namely Ψnn(λ − pid)N . The slope of
the relationship is −(1−β)ΨnnN . In other words, an increase in pi induces a reduction
in output along the chain linking the various firms in a PCE. However, the new equilib-
rium is qualitatively identical to the previous one. By contrast, passed pi∗ the system
switches to the ‘autarchic equilibrium’, with output equal to nµN . The magnification
effect induced by the break-up of the PCE is proportional to (Ψnλ − µ). Note that
the loss Ψnλ− µ is not internalized by the individual firm, that perceives that passed
pi∗, its utility is higher in autarchy. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between expected
utility and the probability of default at the firm level.
13See Hnatkovska and Loyaza (2004) for empirical evidence.
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The notion of ‘crisis volatility’ is captured in our model by the switch from an equi-
librium with a production chain to one without it. The presence of a banking sector
providing financing to enterprises and thus avoiding a credit chain would significantly
decrease the probability of a switch from a production chain equilibrium to autarchy.
2.jpg
Figure 2: Production Chain Equilibrium and Autarchy - Aggregate level of production
and utility
2.2 A model of production chains with trade credit and bank
credit
In this section, we enrich the model with a banking system that can provide funds to
firms to finance the purchase of inputs. Assume firms can finance their inputs with
trade credit (TC) and bank credit (BC). Assume further that there is an equilibrium
15
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1.jpg
Figure 3: Production Chain Equilibrium and Autarchy - Individual level of production
and utility
ratio of trade-to-bank credit, which depends on the relative convenience and availability
of the two instruments. In the limiting case of a fully circular chain with trade credit
only, the default of one firm is transmitted through the chain and may result in a gen-
eralized default because of symmetry across firms. A shock that hits a given proportion
of firms will result in generalized default ex post when TC is the only available form of
external finance. In other words, when an adverse shock hits a given number of firms,
there will be default in payments at every link in the chain, even if the original shock
affected firms far away from a given link. By contrast, default of an individual firm
does not affect payments throughout the chain when bank credit is available. Each firm
finances its purchases with cash and has a debt position with the bank. Banks take
into account the probability of default of their customers and the loss given default
16
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when pricing their loans. The probability of default is equal to the average proportion
of firms defaulting.
Let’s assume as before that pi is the probability of occurrence of an adverse shock
(the probability of default). Denote with α′ the share of firms in a TC-only system that
are hit by the shock, directly and indirectly (ex post) through the chain. Denote with
α the share of firms hit by the shock in a system with bank credit. It follows from the
above reasoning that α′ > α. Without loss of generality, we can assume that α′ = 1.
Assuming that banks lend to all the firms in the chain, the probability of default in an
equilibrium with only bank financing is αpi = pi′ < pi14.
Banks raise funds necessary for lending at a given constant cost r∗. The break-even
condition for banks implies that the lending rate r is such that expected income for
the bank equals its funding costs, a condition that is satisfied in a competitive banking
sector.
(1 + r)(1− pi′) + pi′β = 1 + r∗
or
r =
pi′
(1− pi′)(1− β) +
r∗
(1− pi′) (2)
14Given symmetry across firms, default in trade credit payments does not affect default on bank
loans. One way to rationalize this characterization is that banks are senior creditor with respect to
suppliers, a feature common to most legal systems.
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We assume that the ratio between the two forms of financing, trade credit and bank
credit, is exogenous. This assumption is consistent with the view in Fisman and Love
(2003) and Giannetti et al. (2007) according to which the two forms of financing are
related to technological factors. Define γ = TC
(TC+BC)
, the share of trade credit in total
credit. Initially, we also assume that r∗ = 0. The condition for entry in the production
chain becomes
pi(λ+ β − 1)TC + (1− pi)(λ+ 1− 1)TC + (λ+ 1− 1− r)BC > µN
β > 1− λ− µ
piγ + pi
′
(1−pi′)(1− γ)
= β∗∗ (3)
Under mild assumptions about the characteristics of the shocks affecting the system, a
larger banking sector (a lower γ) increases the probability of obtaining a production-
chain equilibrium (PCE). A sufficient condition is that the probability of an aggregate
shock is low, or in other words, that the probability of a very large shock is low. This
is a mild condition as it has been observed that large declines in aggregate economic
activity are rare events15. Therefore, countries with developed financial sectors tend
to be far away from the critical value of β that triggers the switch to autarchy. The
condition under which bank credit increases the probability of a PCE is
pi <
1− α
α
(4)
In the case of an aggregate shock (α = 1), β < β∗∗ and thus the presence of a banking
sector makes it harder to maintain the PCE.
15See Levchenko et al. (2008).
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Similarly, if the shock arises from the financial sector, for instance through higher
interest rates, a larger banking sector may magnify the shock and induce a break-up of
production chains. Indeed, the presence of the banking sector exposes the country to
potential financial shocks. These shocks can be analyzed by considering an increase in
funding costs r∗, which we now assume to be greater than zero. With r∗ > 0 the new
critical value, β∗∗∗, becomes
β > 1− λ− µ
piγ + pi
′
(1−pi′)(1− γ)
+
r∗
(1− pi′)(1− γ)
[
1
piγ + pi
′
(1−pi′)(1− γ)
]
= β∗∗∗ (5)
Higher funding costs for banks increase β∗∗∗, and thus reduce the range of parameter
values consistent with a PCE. The strength of the financial shock depends on the size
of the banking sector, through the share (1 − γ). Therefore, the benefits of a more
developed domestic financial sector have to be weighed against the greater exposure to
financial shocks. Countries with weak institutions, summarized by low β, are vulnera-
ble to financial shocks, which may induce a switch from a PCE to autarchy. This result
suggests that the role of financial development in softening shocks depends on the na-
ture of the shocks and, in addition, on the institutional strength of the financial sector
(the parameter β). This result has the following empirical implications: An increase in
the credit-to-GDP ratio (CPS) is equivalent to an increase in β and as a result a lower
risk of collapse of the production chain. Furthermore, an increase in (1−γ) corresponds
to an increase in the relative weight of bank credit with respect to trade credit. This
implies lower β∗∗ and β∗∗∗ and thus a higher probability of a PCE, except in the case
of financial and aggregate shocks (higher r∗ or higher α).
19
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In the model, there are two channels through which trade credit affects the response
of the economy to shocks. First, at the firm level, higher reliance on trade credit rela-
tive to bank credit increases the probability of a shift to autarchy following an adverse
shock. In the model, an increase in γ = TC
(TC+BC)
increases β∗∗ , thus making it harder
to sustain a PCE. The individual effect is amplified if all firms in the chain have a
larger reliance on trade credit, and thus the country-level ratio of trade credit to bank
credit is larger. In the model, as we assume that all firms are alike, the individual
γ is equal to the aggregate γ. The second channel relates to the interaction between
trade credit chains and the overall level of development of the financial sector. In our
model this is summarized by the value of β. A higher β makes the PCE more likely.
This implies that sectors that rely more on trade credit (relative to bank credit) have
a better performance (less risk of autarchy) in countries with a higher development of
financial sector (higher β).
3 Empirical analysis
Figure 4 shows that countries with a less developed banking system tend to experience
sharper output falls. Dividing our sample in quartiles based on the distribution of
credit-to-GDP ratios (CPS/GDP), it turns out that the average percentage deviation
of output decline from its full sample mean is 44.65 percentage points higher in the
first quartile (lowest credit-to-GDP ratios) than in the fourth quartile (highest credit-
20
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to-GDP ratios)16.
In the next section we investigate whether the negative relationship between the mag-
nitude of output drops and the depth of credit markets survives in an econometric
analysis, which allows to control for other factors affecting output falls.
Figure 4: Percentage falls in real value added and financial development
3.1 Sample and data issues
Our starting point is the analysis of Rajan and Zingales (1998), which has become a
main reference in the literature on finance and growth, mainly because the authors
addressed the problem of endogeneity and reverse causality, which characterized most
of the cross-country literature. Using industry-level data, Rajan and Zingales proposed
16This difference is significant at conventional levels.
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a solution to this problem. In particular, they used the dependence on external finance
of manufacturing sectors in the US as a measure of the ‘technological’ dependence on
external finance of these industries worldwide. The idea is based on the assumption
that US financial markets are close to perfect and thus the financial structure of firms
in the US is determined by an optimal choice, based solely on technological factors.
In addition, Rajan and Zingales argue that differences across firms in the same sector
are minor, and thus sectoral indicators are a good proxy for firm-level dependence on
external finance. Since the US indicators of financial dependence can be considered as
exogenous indicators of financing needs, a cross-country analysis of industrial output
growth, excluding the US, can be used to determine the impact of financial development
on growth. The sectoral US financial dependence indicator is multiplied by the level of
financial sector development in different countries to construct what is by now a fami-
liar indicator in the literature, the Rajan-Zingales indicator (henceforth RZ indicator).
In our estimations, we interact the RZ indicator of external dependence with the pri-
vate sector credit-to-GDP ratio. A positive coefficient on the RZ indicator implies that
sectors that need more external finance grow faster in countries with a more developed
financial sector. We make use of this methodology in order to test the implications of
our theoretical model.
We use value added data from the UNIDO database. Our main sample covers a total
of 115 countries across 28 manufacturing industries (3-digit ISIC Rev.2 level) between
22
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1963 and 200417. Data are deflated using CPI from the IMF IFS database18. Our sam-
ple is dominated by emerging markets and developing countries. Using the World Bank
income categorization, 29 countries are ‘low income’, 27 are ‘lower middle income’, 27
are ‘upper middle income’, and 32 are ‘high income’. By contrast, the sample used
by Rajan and Zingales (1998) covers only 41 countries between 1980 and 1990 and is
dominated by high-income countries. Using the World Bank classification, their sample
consists of 5 low-income countries, 7 lower-middle income countries, 8 upper-middle in-
come countries and 21 high income countries. This difference is important since we are
interested in studying episodes of sharp output contraction, many of which happened
in emerging markets after 1990 (e.g. ouput collapse in the fomer Communist block, the
Mexican crisis, the Asian crisis and the Russian crisis). A statistical description of the
sample is provided in the Appendix.
In addition, we introduce a methodological extension. Instead of working with an-
nual data, we conduct our analysis on ‘episodes’ of growth or decline in value added.
We trace the episodes of output decline (growth) starting from the first year of negative
(positive) output change until the end of the contraction (expansion). We believe this
is a better approach for dealing with a data set that has a lot of missing data, especially
for emerging markets. We define two different measures that capture industry decline
17Since the time span is not the same across all countries, we have an unbalanced panel.
18The choice of CPI as deflator allowed us to retain the largest possible number of countries, as for
many developing countries the CPI is the only price index available for a long time series.
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(growth). The first measure is simply the absolute value of the average percentage
change of value added over the period of decline (growth) - from the first year to the
trough (peak) of the recession (expansion). In other words, it is the absolute value of
4% = [(1 +4t−n−1)...(1 +4t−1)(1 +4t)]− 1
for an episode that lasts n years, where 4t represents the percentage change between
year t − 1 and t. The second measure is related to the ‘area’ of the output decline
(growth), also from the first year to the trough (peak) of the recession (expansion).
For notational simplicity, define 4 = (1 + 4t−n−1)...(1 + 4t−1)(1 + 4t). Then, the
‘area’ variable is
area =
1 + (1 +4t−n−1)− 24
2
+ ...+
(1 +4t−2) + (1 +4t−2)(1 +4t−1)− 24
2
+
(1 +4t−2)(1 +4t−1)−4
2
for an episode of decline that lasts n years.
Since our aim is to study crisis episodes, we distinguish between mild and sharp output
contractions, and focus on the latter. We define sharp contractions as cumulative falls
in real value added greater than the median value for the whole sample, which is 0.1658
for the percentage variable and 0.1076 for the area variable19.
19Calvo et al. (2006) use a similar measure to identify episodes of sharp recessions at the country
level.
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3.2 OLS estimations - truncated sample
We first replicate the analysis of Rajan and Zingales using a sample that consists of the
episodes of sharp contractions in valued added and estimate the following model
Growthj,k = Constant + β1...m.Country Indicators
+ βm+1...n.Industry Indicators
+ βn+1.(Industry j ’s share of manufacturing in country k in first available year)
+ βn+2.(External Dependence of industry j . Financial Development of country k)
+ j,k
As in Rajan and Zingales (1998), we include sector and country dummies to account
for omitted variables. The regression includes an industry’s share of total manufac-
turing in a country in the first available year of observation for that country-industry
combination in order to control for convergence effects, namely the fact that certain
industries will grow faster just because they start from a very low level. As mentioned
above, an industry’s dependence on external finance is measured by the RZ indicator.
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To avoid endogeneity problems, related to the potential reverse causality between in-
dustry growth and the level of financial development, we use the credit-to-GDP ratio
in the first year of each episode.
Table 1 reports the results of these OLS estimations20. During episodes of decline,
we find a significantly negative effect of credit market development on the magnitude
of output falls for both measures, average percentage change or area. This indicates
that industries which are relatively more dependent on external finance suffer relatively
smaller declines in countries with better financial sector development. In other words,
even after controlling for sector and country effects, a higher level of financial deve-
lopment significantly reduces the magnitude of output declines21. If we constrain our
sample to include sharp contractions only, namely contractions greater than the median
20As a robustness check, we also estimate the model using output data instead of value added and
find that results do not change substantially. They are not reported here. Our output sample covers
a total of 120 countries across the same 28 industries between 1963 and 2004, and has a very similar
composition in terms of countries’ income levels.
21We also checked whether the effects could be nonlinear, with the coefficient on the interaction
term varying depending on the depth of credit markets. We multiplied the interaction term between
financial development and the RZ-measure of external dependence with a dummy for each quartile of
the credit-to-GDP ratio in our sample. The coefficients on the interaction terms are all negative and
significant at conventional levels. The effect decreases as countries become more financially developed.
These results are not reported here.
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Table 1: Episodes of decline - value added data; OLS robust std errors (t-statistics
between brackets)
Periods of economic downturn Percentage Area
change
Industry’s share of total output in first year of sample -0.095 0.018
(-2.68)* (0.31)
Interaction (financial development x RZ-indicator) -0.041 -0.074
(-2.61)* (-2.59)*
Number of observations 13339 13339
Periods of sharp contraction Percentage Area
change
Industry’s share of total output in first year of sample -0.072 0.123
(-1.56) (1.28)
Interaction (financial development x RZ-indicator) -0.052 -0.159
(-2.01)** (-2.72)*
Number of observations 6554 6563
Note: Significance levels are (*) 1%; (**) 5%; and (***) 10%.
in absolute value, we obtain similar results. The fact that the coefficients on the inter-
action term are larger in absolute value than when all episodes of decline are included,
suggests that credit markets matter most during deep recessions.
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3.3 Probit and logit estimations - full sample22
The above analysis is subject to the criticism that the OLS coefficients may be biased
because, by isolating episodes of decline, we truncate the sample and ignore the in-
formation effectively contained in the positive growth data. In order to address this
point and verify the robustness of our results, we perform a Probit estimation on the
full sample of episodes, i.e. the sample that includes both episodes of downturn and
growth. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the episode is a
downturn and the value 0 if positive growth is observed. The probit model is defined
as
Pr(y = 1|x) = Φ(xb)
where Φ is the standard cumulative normal probability distribution and xb the probit
index specified as in the OLS model.
In addition, we estimate a logit model using the method of penalized maximum likeli-
hood in order to solve a ‘separation problem’ present in our data set23. The logit model
22Since the results are similar whether we use the percentage or area variable, we only use the
percentage variable in the remainder of the paper.
23‘Separation’ occurs when a single type of episode (downturn or growth) is observed for a country-
industry combination and consequently that specific country-industry combination perfectly predicts
the binary outcome. Since our statistical software package (Stata) addresses the separation issue by
simply dropping the problematic observations in the probit estimations, we estimate a logit model with
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is defined as
Pr(y = 1|x) = F (xb) = 1
1 + e−xb
where xb is the logit index specified as in the OLS model in the previous section.
Table 2 presents the regression coefficients from the probit and logit estimations using
two samples. The first sample contains 49 countries used in the analysis by Rajan and
Zingales (1998), the second includes 103 countries. Both samples only include sharp
downturns as defined above. The coefficient on the interaction term between financial
Table 2: Episodes of sharp decline - value added data; logit and probit estimations
Logit (penalized maximum likelihood)
coeff. on cpsrz std. error p-value no. of obs
Rajan Zingales sample -0.238 0.201 0.236 10343
All countries -0.336** 0.156 0.031 18491
Probit (maximum likelihood)
coeff. on cpsrz std. error p-value no. of obs
Rajan Zingales sample -0.126 0.118 0.284 10343
All countries -0.192** 0.092 0.037 18491
Note: Significance levels are (*) 1%; (**) 5%; and (***) 10%. Coefficients on other variables are
omitted for brevity.
a method based on a penalized likelihood correction to the standard binomial GLM score function as
proposed by Zorn (2005).
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dependence and financial development is negative in both samples. A negative coef-
ficient means that industries that are relatively more dependent on external finance
are less likely to experience a sharp decline in value added in countries with developed
financial markets. However, the coefficient is only significant (at the 5% level) in the
larger sample. It is not surprising that the coefficient is larger in absolute value and
more significant in the larger sample as the latter is dominated by emerging markets
and developing countries. By contrast, the sample used by Rajan and Zingales (1998)
is dominated by high-income countries.
Table 3 reports the average interaction effects between financial development and fi-
nancial dependence obtained from the above logit and probit estimations. In non-linear
models like logit and probit, the marginal effect of a change in both interacted variables
is not equal to the marginal effect of changing just the interaction term, meaning that
one cannot simply use the coefficient on the interaction term reported in Table 3 to
study the interaction effect between financial development and dependence on external
finance. The interaction effect is defined as the change in the predicted probability of
a downturn for a 1-unit change in both the credit-to-GDP ratio and the RZ indicator
of financial dependence. In other words, it is the double derivative with respect to
financial development (cps) and financial dependence (rz). For the probit model, it is
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computed as follows24
∂2Φ(xb)
∂cps∂rz
= [βn+2 − (βn+2 ∗ cps)(βn+2 ∗ rz)xb]φ(xb) (6)
For the logit model, it is computed as
∂2F (xb)
∂cps∂rz
= βn+2[F (xb)(1−F (xb))]+(βn+2∗rz)(βn+2∗cps)[F (xb)(1−F (xb))(1−2F (xb))]
(7)
The average interaction effects are similar in both the logit and probit estimations,
suggesting that the separation problem is not severe. In the RZ sample, on average,
the probability of a downturn decreases by between 4.1% and 4.6% when both financial
development and financial dependence increase by 1 unit. In the overall sample, on
average, the probability of a downturn decreases by between 6.5% and 6.9% when both
financial development and financial dependence increase by 1 unit. Again, given that
our sample contains relatively more emerging markets, it is not surprising to find a
larger interaction effect on the whole sample.
It is very difficult to obtain a z-statistic for the interaction effects in the logit and
probit models with so many indicator variables25. However, the significance of the
24We compute the interaction effects as in Ai and Norton (2004).
25To remind, we have 28 industry indicators and 103 country indicators.
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Table 3: Episodes of sharp decline - value added data; average interaction effects from
logit and probit estimations
Logit (penalized maximum likelihood)
mean stdev. min max no. of obs
Rajan Zingales sample -0.046 0.010 -0.060 -0.015 10343
All countries -0.069 0.013 -0.085 -0.012 18491
Probit (maximum likelihood)
mean stdev. min max no. of obs
Rajan Zingales sample -0.041 0.007 -0.050 -0.014 10343
All countries -0.065 0.010 -0.077 -0.009 18491
interaction effects can easily be investigated in the probit model when the country-
industry indicators are omitted and we control for country and industry fixed effects
by including financial dependence and financial development separately as additional
explanatory variables. The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The coefficients
on the interaction term reported in Table 4 are similar in magnitude to the coefficients
obtained from the logit estimations with country-industry indicators. They are signifi-
cantly negative in both samples. The average interaction effects reported in Table 5 are
larger than the ones obtained from the models with the country-industry indicators. In
the RZ sample, on average, the probability of a downturn decreases by 9% when both
financial development and financial dependence increase by 1 unit. In the overall sam-
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ple, on average, the probability of a downturn decreases by 10.1% when both financial
development and financial dependence increase by 1 unit.
Table 4: Episodes of sharp decline - value added data; logit and probit estimations
Probit (maximum likelihood)
coeff. on cpsrz std. error p-value no. of obs
Rajan Zingales sample -0.282** 0.125 0.024 10343
All countries -0.293* 0.097 0.003 18491
Note: Significance levels are (*) 1%; (**) 5%; and (***) 10%. Coefficients on other variables are
omitted for brevity.
Table 5: Episodes of sharp decline - value added data; average interaction effects from
logit and probit estimations
Probit (maximum likelihood)
mean stdev. min max no. of obs
Rajan Zingales sample -0.090 0.011 -0.105 0.005 10343
All countries -0.101 0.012 -0.117 0.015 18491
Figures 5 and 6 plot the z-statistics of the interaction effects against predicted probabi-
lities of a downturn for the probit model above. The figures show that most interaction
effects are significant at the 5% level, especially when the whole sample is used.
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Figure 5: z-statistics of interaction effects - probit model, Rajan Zingales sample, sharp
downturns.
Figure 6: z-statistics of interaction effects - probit model, full sample, sharp downturns.
Visual analysis of logit results
We now perform a visual analysis of the results obtained from the logit regressions.
We look at the impact of the credit-to-GDP ratio on the odds of a downturn26 as
26The odds of a downturn are defined as the ratio of the probability of a downturn to the probability
of an upturn.
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a function of the RZ indicator of financial dependence. Using the logit regression
results, we compute the predicted log odds of a downturn as a function of the credit-
to-GDP ratio for the minimum and maximum values of the RZ indicator (-0.45 and
1.14 respectively). Figures 7 and 8 plot the predicted log odds of a downturn against
the credit-to-GDP ratio for the minimum and maximum values of the RZ indicator
when the RZ sample is used. Figures 9 and 10 present the analogous results for the
entire sample. The predicted log odds of a downturn seem independent of financial
development when financial dependence is low, i.e. when the RZ indicator is at its
minimum. By contrast, the predicted log odds of a downturn clearly decrease with
financial development when financial dependence is high.
Figure 7: Predicted log odds of a downturn as a function of financial development when
RZ indicator is at its minimum, RZ sample
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Figure 8: Predicted log odds of a downturn as a function of financial development when
RZ indicator is at its maximum, RZ sample
Figure 9: Predicted log odds of a downturn as a function of financial development when
RZ indicator is at its minimum, full sample
3.4 Probit and logit estimations - controlling for financial crises
In order to control for the impact of financial crises, we also interact the interaction
term between the RZ-indicator and financial development with a dummy for financial
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Figure 10: Predicted log odds of a downturn as a function of financial development
when RZ indicator is at its maximum, full sample
and currency crises. The dummy is obtained by combining the financial crisis and cur-
rency crisis dummies from Cerra and Saxena (2008). In this case the probit and logit
indices become
Growthj,k = Constant + β1...m.Country Indicators
+ βm+1...n.Industry Indicators
+ βn+1.(Industry j ’s share of manufacturing in country k in first available year)
+ βn+2.(External Dependence of industry j . Financial Development of country k)
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+ βn+3.(External Dependence of industry j . Financial Development of country k).
(crisis dummy)
+ j,k
The results are reported in Table 6. The coefficients on the interaction between fi-
nancial dependence and financial development (crpsrz) are negative in both samples
and significant at the 1% level, an improvement on the estimations without the crisis
dummy. The coefficients on the additional interaction term (crisiscpsrz) are signifi-
cantly positive at the 1% level. A positive coefficient indicates that during a financial
or currency crisis, industries which are relatively more dependent on external finance
are more likely to experience sharp decreases in value added in countries with more
developed financial markets. In other words, well-developed financial markets cannot
cushion shocks to the economy that originate in the financial sector. The coefficient
on crisiscpsrz is systematically larger in absolute value than the coefficient on cpsrz,
indicating that well-developed financial markets will overall increase the likelihood of
sharp declines in value added when the recession originates from shocks to the financial
sector. In other words, financial markets become a shock-transmittor rather than a
shock-absorber when the shock originates in the financial sector.
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Table 6: Episodes of sharp decline - value added data; logit and probit estimations with
financial crisis dummy
Logit (penalized maximum likelihood)
coeff. on cpsrz coeff. on crisiscpsrz no. of obs
Rajan Zingales sample -0.799* 1.016* 10343
All countries -0.780* 0.948* 18491
Probit (maximum likelihood)
coeff. on cpsrz coeff. on crisiscpsrz no. of obs
Rajan Zingales sample -0.457* 0.594* 10343
All countries -0.455* 0.560* 18491
Note: Significance levels are (*) 1%; (**) 5%; and (***) 10%. Coefficients on other variables are
omitted for brevity.
3.5 Relative dependence on bank credit versus trade credit
In the model, there are two channels through which trade credit affects the response
of the economy to shocks. In this scetion, we investigate the first one. In the model,
higher reliance on trade credit relative to bank credit at the firm level increases the
probability of a shift to autarchy following an adverse shock. In the model, an increase
in γ = TC
(TC+BC)
increases β∗∗; thus making it harder to sustain a PCE. The individual
effect is amplified if all firms in the chain have a larger reliance on trade credit, and
thus the overall ratio of trade credit over bank credit is larger at the country level. To
test the theoretical predictions, we use data from Raddatz (2008) on the ratio of short-
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term debt to payables at the country and industry-level as an indicator of the country
and industry-level relative dependence on bank credit vis-a`-vis trade credit. This limits
our sample to 40 countries and 28 industries27. We estimate the following model by OLS
Growthj,k = Constant + β1...m.Country Indicators
+ βm+1...n.Industry Indicators
+ βn+1.(Industry j ’s share of manufacturing in country k in first available year)
+ βn+2.(External Dependence of industry j . Financial Development of country k)
+ βn+3.(External Dependence of industry j . Financial Development of country k).
(crisis dummy)
+ βn+4.(Relative Dependence of industry j on bank credit).
(Relative Dependence of country k on bank credit)
+ βn+5.(Relative Dependence of industry j on bank credit).
27This reduces the number of observations to 10,474.
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(Relative Dependence of country k on bank credit).(crisis dummy)
+ j,k
28
As shown in Table 7, the interaction term between the RZ indicator and a country’s
financial development loses its significance. So does the interaction term with the crisis
dummy. However, the coefficient on the interaction term between industry-level rela-
tive dependence on bank credit and country-level relative dependence on bank credit
is significantly positive. This is in line with the theoretical model which predicts a
positive coefficient on bctc ic given that a higher ratio of bank credit to trade credit
implies a higher probability of a PCE. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction
between bctc ic and the crisis dummy is significantly negative. This indicates that the
role of the banking sector in softening shocks depends on the nature of the shocks.
In particular, when shocks originate in the financial sector, a higher dependence on
bank credit relative to trade credit no longer softens the ourput declines. In summary,
higher bank credit ratios produce better performance (lower risk of autarchy), except
for periods of financial crises.
In order to estimate the impact of the relative dependence on bank credit versus trade
28We do not include the variable crisis separately because it is a country effect already captured by
the country indicators.
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Table 7: OLS regression; sample of episodes; dependent variable: cumulative percentage
growth
coefficient p-value
Constant -0.147* 0.000
Industry’s share in first year 0.105 0.315
cpsrz -0.043 0.175
Interaction btw cpsrz and crisis dummy -0.006 0.825
bctc ic 0.020*** 0.051
Interaction btw bctc ic and crisis dummy -0.011** 0.016
Note: cpsrz is the interaction term between the RZ indicator of external dependence and the credit-
to-GDP ratio; bctc ic is the interaction term between the industry-level and country level ratios of
bank credit to trade credit as measured in Raddatz (2008). Significance levels are (*) 1%; (**) 5%;
and (***) 10%. Coefficients on other variables are omitted for brevity.
credit on the probability of a sharp contraction, we estimate the following Probit model
Growthj,k = Constant + β1...m.Country Indicators
+ βm+1...n.Industry Indicators
+ βn+1.(Industry j ’s share of manufacturing in country k in first available year)
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+ βn+2.(Relative Dependence of industry j on bank credit).
(Relative Dependence of country k on bank credit)
+ βn+3.(Relative Dependence of industry j on bank credit).
(Relative Dependence of country k on bank credit).(crisis dummy)
+ j,k
Table 8: Probit regression; sample of episodes; dependent variable: downturn dummy
coefficient p-value
Constant -0.274 0.272
Industry’s share in first year -0.690*** 0.095
bctc ic -0.096** 0.015
Interaction btw bctc ic and crisis dummy 0.113*** 0.000
Note: bctc ic is the interaction term between the industry-level and country level ratios of bank credit
to trade credit as measured in Raddatz (2008). Significance levels are (*) 1%; (**) 5%; and (***) 10%.
Coefficients on other variables are omitted for brevity.
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As can be seen from Table 8, the interaction term between industry and country-
level relative dependence on bank credit is significantly negative, meaning that a higher
dependence on bank credit at the country and industry level significantly reduces the
probability of sharp contractions. This is no longer the case when shocks originate in
the financial sector. These results are in line with Table 7.
3.6 Trade credit, bank credit and financial development
Finally, we investigate the second channel through which trade credit influences growth
in the theoretical model. The second channel relates to the interaction between trade
credit chains and the overall level of development of the financial sector, β. A higher
β makes the PCE more likely. This implies that sectors that rely more on trade credit
relative to bank credit have a better performance (lower risk of autarchy) in countries
with a higher development of the financial sector. We test these theoretical predictions
using the following OLS estimation
Growthj,k = Constant + β1...m.Country Indicators
+ βm+1...n.Industry Indicators
+ βn+1.(Industry j ’s share of manufacturing in country k in first available year)
+ βn+2.(External Dependence of industry j . Financial Development of country k)
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+ βn+3.(External Dependence of industry j . Financial Development of country k).
(crisis dummy)
+ βn+4.(Relative Dependence of industry j on bank credit).
(Financial Development of country k)
+ βn+5.(Relative Dependence of industry j on bank credit).
(Financial Development of country k).(crisis dummy)
+ j,k
29
As can be seen in Table 9, the coefficients on the variables involving the RZ indica-
tor have again become insignificant. The coefficient on the interaction between the
industry-level relative dependence on bank credit and the credit-to-GDP ratio is signif-
icantly negative, which is in line with the theoretical predictions (remember that bctc
is the inverse of γ = TC
(TC+BC)
). It is interesting to note that our results are different
from those of Fisman and Love (2003), who found that sectors relying on trade credit
29We do not include the variable crisis separately because it is a country effect already captured by
the country indicators.
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Table 9: OLS regression; sample of episodes; dependent variable: cumulative percentage
growth
coefficient p-value
Constant -0.037 0.415
Industry’s share in first year 0.100 0.339
cpsrz -0.014 0.671
Interaction btw cpsrz and crisis dummy 0.010 0.754
bctc cps -0.060* 0.000
Interaction btw bctc cps and crisis dummy -0.028** 0.019
Note: cpsrz is the interaction term between the RZ indicator of external dependence and the credit-
to-GDP ratio; bctc cps is the interaction term between the industry-level ratio of bank credit to trade
credit as measured in Raddatz (2008) and credit-to-GDP. Significance levels are (*) 1%; (**) 5%; and
(***) 10%. Coefficients on other variables are omitted for brevity.
performed better in coutries with lower levels of financial development as measured by
the credit-to-GDP ratio. The reasoning behind this result is that firms in less-developed
countries are able to grow by substituting scarce bank credit with trade credit. How-
ever, this need not be in contradiction with our results. The mechanism through which
bank credit contributes to growth in our model is different. Our model highlights the
mechanisms that are relevant during sharp output contractions: A well-developed finan-
cial sector is important to ensure growth when firms depend on trade credit because it
buffers shocks that can lead to the collapse of the PCE. Again note that higher financial
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development no longer softens output declines when shocks originate in the financial
sector.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the potential asymmetric effects of financial markets on growth. The
paper first develops a simple theoretical framework of production chains with credit
chains in order to investigate the channels through which credit markets contribute to
the magnification of negative exogenous shocks. The model shows that, when credit
market institutions are weak (i.e. contract enforcement is low), exogenous shocks may
induce a break-up of both credit and production chains, leading to sudden and sharp
collapses in output. The development of a banking sector can mitigate downside output
volatility, conditional on a given level of contract enforcement. By contrast, reliance on
trade credit increases the vulnerability to a sudden output collapse. Hence, the model
shows how weak credit market institutions may help explain the asymmetry found in the
empirical analysis. However, when the shocks are aggregate and/or originate from the
financial sector, a more developed banking sector cannot shield the economy from the
adverse shocks. In fact, in such cases, the banking sector becomes a shock-transmittor
rather than a shock-absorber.
The predictions of the model are tested using industry-level data across a large cross-
section of countries. The empirical analysis shows with various model specifications
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that financial development plays an important role in reducing the probability and the
magnitude of sharp contractions in value-added. In particular, industries which are
relatively more dependent on external finance decline relatively faster (and/or are more
likely to experience a decline) in countries with lower financial sector development, mea-
sured as the credit-to-GDP ratio. For countries at a low level of financial development,
such a role may be more important than the positive effect of financial markets during
periods of growth, which supports the conjecture that the impact of financial deve-
lopment on growth is asymmetric. The empirical analysis also provides support for
the theoretical predictions regarding trade credit and its interaction with bank credit.
First, we find that higher reliance on trade credit relative to bank credit at the firm and
country levels increases the probability and magnitude of sharp contractions. Second,
we find that sectors that rely more on trade credit relative to bank credit experience
milder contractions in countries with a better developed financial sector. Finally, we
find that when the shocks originate from the financial sector, a more developed banking
sector cannot shield the economy from the adverse shocks.
The paper could be usefully extended along several directions. In addition to the
identification of period of financial crises, it would be useful to identify different shocks
to the various countries, distinguishing shocks arising from terms of trade changes -
real shocks - and those arising from tightening of credit markets - financial shocks.
Finally, episodes of downturn and growth could be classified in a finer way. In addition
to the distinction between periods of mild decline and deep recessions, upturns can
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be separated between periods of recovery and growth30. Finally, the role of different
sources of financing during the recovery period following sharp output decline could
be investigated in order to verify at the industry level the phenomenon of credit-less
recoveries observed in macroeconomic data.
30See also Hausmann et al. (2005) on growth accelerations.
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Appendix: Descriptive statistics - episodes of decline
Table 10: Descriptive statistics - overall averages and standard deviations
mean std. dev.
percentage 0.2471831 0.244562
area 0.2608466 0.4270972
CPS/GDP 0.4091753 0.3189869
Real GDP per capita 9211.248 7460.719
Note: Real GDP per capita at 2000 USD PPP from Penn World Tables
Table 11: Descriptive statistics - by World Bank income categories
percentage area CPS/GDP Real GDP
per capita
Low income 0.3083234 0.299191 0.1714772 1479.227
Lower middle income 0.2967555 0.2882302 0.2581137 3613.993
Upper middle income 0.2671119 0.287795 0.3289129 8186.305
High income: OECD 0.1554151 0.1943514 0.630864 16272.59
High income: non OECD 0.2750322 0.2879059 0.6593155 17474.61
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Table 12: Descriptive statistics - by quartiles of the sample distribution of credit-to-
GDP
percentage area CPS/GDP Real GDP
per capita
Q1 0.2968287 0.2914494 0.1250744 3577.683
Q2 0.245981 0.253351 0.2397689 7192.928
Q3 0.2392876 0.2531248 0.420091 10014.06
Q4 0.1855446 0.2217815 0.8810022 16390.43
Table 13: Descriptive statistics - by quartiles of the sample distribution of real GDP
per capita
percentage area CPS/GDP Real GDP
per capita
Q1 0.2925583 0.2662823 0.1782823 1705.991
Q2 0.2850261 0.3033266 0.3020533 4704.908
Q3 0.2143717 0.2401186 0.4547584 10566.14
Q4 0.1964281 0.2365459 0.7051304 19912.6
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